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Abstract
New safety critical systems are about to appear in our everyday life: advanced
robots able to interact with humans and perform tasks at home, in hospi-
tals, or at work. A hazardous behavior of those systems, induced by failures
or extreme environment conditions, may lead to catastrophic consequences.
Well-known risk analysis methods used in other critical domains (e.g., avion-
ics, nuclear, medical, transportation), have to be extended or adapted due
to the non-deterministic behavior of those systems, evolving in unstructured
environments. One major challenge is thus to develop methods that can be
applied at the very beginning of the development process, to identify hazards
induced by robot tasks and their interactions with humans. In this paper we
present a method which is based on an adaptation of a hazard identification
technique, HAZOP (Hazard Operability), coupled with a system description
notation, UML (Unified Modeling Language). This systematic approach has
been applied successfully in research projects, and is now applied by robot
manufacturers. Some results of those studies are presented and discussed to
explain the benefits and limits of our method.
Keywords: Hazard identification, Risk analysis, Robot safety, HAZOP,
UML
1. Introduction
Besides the developments of well-known safety critical systems in aero-
nautics or transportation, new systems are about to appear in our everyday
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life: robots at home, at work, or in the hospitals (Royakkers and van Est,
2015). Such systems, will interact with users, and execute tasks in the vicinity
or even in physical contact with humans. Hence, a failure of such complex
systems may lead to catastrophic consequences for users which is a major
obstacle to their deployment in real life. Most safety analysis techniques
coming from the dependability (Avizˇienis et al., 2004) or risk management
(ISO31000, 2009) domains could be used for such systems, but some speci-
ficities of robots limit their efficiency. For instance, the fact that robots move
in unstructured and unknown environments makes the verification and vali-
dation (mainly through testing) non sufficient (it is impossible to guarantee
that all main scenarios have been tested); the presence of users and com-
plex non deterministic software (with decisional mechanisms) limit the use
of quantitative risk analysis techniques; classical hazard analysis techniques
are also not adapted to the complexity of human-robot interactions. Little
work has been done about risk analysis for such systems, although it is a
major challenge for robot certification (Mitka et al., 2012). Many robotics
studies about estimation and treatment of collision risks exist (many refer-
ences presented by Haddadin (2014)), but few are on risk analysis methods
(Dogramadzi et al., 2014). The safety community has rarely addressed this
issue, whereas we have been working on this for a decade (Guiochet and
Vilchis, 2002; Guiochet et al., 2004).
Some robot manufacturers use directives (2006/42/EC, 2006) or stan-
dards (ISO13849-1, 2006) dedicated to machines, but they are not completely
applicable, particularly when there is a human-robot physical interaction.
Generic standards like IEC61508-5 (2010), are also hardly applicable due to
uncertainties in the robot behavior (in this standard, fault correction through
artificial intelligence is not recommended for safety integrity level SIL2 to
SIL4). More recently, the standard ISO10218-1 (2011) for industrial robots
that might share their workspace with humans, has been completed by the
ISO13482 (2014). It is also important to note that such standards, do not
cover other application domain robots. For instance, in the medical field,
there is no robotic-specific standard, and the robots are considered as active
medical devices such as defined in the 93/42/EEC (1993), and covered by
ISO/FDIS14971 (2006) for risk management. In all those standards, classic
risk management and design recommendations are proposed, but no specific
guidelines for risk analysis techniques are presented.
To cope with the previous issues, we suggest a hazard identification tech-
nique with the following objectives:
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1. applicable from the very beginning of the development process
2. includes human activity as a source of hazard
3. provides guidance for analysts with list of guide words
4. focuses on operational hazards, i.e., hazards linked with the robot tasks
and interactions
Among risk analysis techniques, the most widely used are Preliminary Hazard
Analysis (PHA), Hazard Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Fault Tree Anal-
ysis (FTA), and Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
The two first may be applied as hazard analysis at the very early steps of a
development process, whereas FTA and FMECA are more dedicated to ad-
vanced steps, focusing more on reliability aspects. Thus, we chose to base our
method on HAZOP, and to combine it with the system modeling language
UML (Unified Modeling Language). This method developed at LAAS (Guio-
chet et al., 2010; Martin-Guillerez et al., 2010; Guiochet et al., 2013), has been
successfully applied in several French and European projects (PHRIENDS,
2006-2009; SAPHARI, 2011-2015; MIRAS, 2009-2013) in collaboration with
robot manufacturers (KUKA Robotics, AIRBUS Group and Robosoft). This
paper synthesizes for the first time our work on HAZOP-UML, and proposes
an analysis of the applications in these projects.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
background on UML and HAZOP. In Section 3, we present the HAZOP-
UML method, and in Section 4, results of several experiments are analyzed
and discussed. In Section 5, related work on model-based safety analysis
is compared to our approach. We conclude in Section 6 by outlining the
benefits and limits of HAZOP-UML, and listing some future directions.
2. Background
2.1. Unified Modeling Language
UML (Unified Modeling Language) is a graphical notation, widely used
in software and system engineering domains to support early steps of the
development process. Its specification is available on the Object Management
Group UML page1. The current version (UML 2), has thirteen diagrams,
that could be classified in static diagrams (e.g., class diagram) and dynamic
diagrams (e.g., use case, sequence and state machine diagrams). UML is
1www.uml.org : accessed 2015-05-15
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4.4 Analyse et évaluation des risques 103
Figure 4.4 – Le premier prototype (Robosoft) (à gauche) et le deuxième (ISIR)(à droite)
extrait d’une table HAZOP telle que nous l’avons déployée est donné Figure 4.7. Cette
étude a donné lieu à une liste de dangers présentée Figure 4.9, que l’on a extrait des tables
HAZOP. Pour chaque danger nous avons également utilisé des références vers les lignes des
tables HAZOP induisant le danger. Ce travail permet ainsi d’avoir une traçabilité entre
les causes et les conséquences, et peut s’avérer très utile si l’on souhaite utiliser d’autres
techniques d’analyse du risque comme les arbres de fautes ou une AMDEC par exemple.
La liste est donnée ci-dessous :
HN01 Posture incorrecte du patient pendant l’utilisation du robot (penché en avant ou
en arrière)
HN02 Chute du patient pendant l’utilisation du robot (comme pour un déambulateur
classique), soit au sol, soit sur le robot lui-même
HN03 Arrêt total du robot pendant l’utilisation (absence d’énergie), rendant impossible
toute action du robot
HN04 Chute du patient sans alarme ou avec alarme tardive
HN05 Problème physiologique du patient sans alarme ou avec alarme tardive
HN06 Chute du patient provoquée par le robot (mouvement non désiré du robot)
HN07 Incident détecté mais défaut de passage en mode sûr ; le robot continue à se
déplacer alors qu’il a un déséquilibre, une chute ou une fatigue du patient
HN08 Le robot coince un membre du patient entre 2 parties du robot ou entre le robot
et un objet fixe
HN09 Collision entre le robot (ou partie du robot) et le patient
Figure 1: MIRAS robot prototype during clinical investigation
a language, an not a method, as it i not sp cified in which chronological
order each diagram must be used. But, use cases and sequence diagrams are
typically used at the beginning of any project development. State machine
diagrams are also widely used in reactive systems as robot controllers. Hence,
we will p sent those three diagrams, focusing only in the elements we will
use for our approach. One main pitfall using this language is to mix different
levels of det ils in the same diagram. For inst ce, mixing some high level
specifications with implementation constraints on the same diagram is error
prone and also n t recommended for the safety analysis. This is why we also
put forward in this paper some odeling rules to avoid this pitfall and to
guide the analysts.
As a running exa ple, we will use some models of the case study MIRAS
(2009-2013), an assistive robot presented Figure 1, for standing up, sitting
down and walking, and also capable of health-state monitoring of the pa-
tients. It is designed to be used in elderly care centers by people suffering
from gait and orientation problems where a classic wheeled walker (or “rolla-
tor”), is not sufficient for patient autonomy. The robotic rollator is composed
of a mobile base and a moving handlebar.
Use case diagrams. This diagram is the basic requirement UML model, pre-
senting the system to analyse, the actors communicating with it, and the
objectives for the use of the system: the use cases. The example of Figure 2
only presents a subset of the complete use case diagram (15 use cases), and
the two involved actors. In this diagram, the proposed services are to help
the patient to stand up (UC02), deambulate (UC01), and sit down (UC03).
The system is also able to detect physiological issues and trigger an alarm
(patient heartbeat and fatigue, in UC08). We also represent that the system
offers the profile learning facility (UC10). In some projects using UML the
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Patient
MIRAS Robot
UC01
Strolling UC02
Standing up 
operation
Medical Staff
UC03
Sitting down 
operation
UC08
Alarm 
Handling
UC10
Patient profile 
learning
Actor
Use case
Association
Studied system boundary
Figure 2: Extract of MIRAS use case diagram from Guiochet et al. (2013)
mechanical part of a robot is represented as a UML actor, and the system
boundary (the box around use cases) defines the robot controller (including
software and hardware). We do not recommend using such an approach to
perform the hazard identification, indeed, the complete system has to be
studied as a whole.
This diagram provides an expressive and simple mean to communicate be-
tween developers, analysts and users. This graphical representation is always
completed with a textual description as in Figure 3. Important information
such pre and post conditions, and non-functional requirements are included.
Use case diagram only represents functional requirements. Textual descrip-
tion of the normal, alternative and exception flows may also be presented
with sequence diagrams as presented hereafter.
In the UML OMG standard, some relations may exist between use cases
(mainly the relations extend and include) but we recommend not to use
them, as they often lead to misunderstandings and to an unclear application
of the HAZOP-UML method. In order to prepare the HAZOP-UML study,
an extract from the use case textual description should be done, with only the
pre and post conditions, and also the invariants coming from safety properties
in the “Non functional requirements” category. An example of such a table
is given in Figure 4 for the UC02 of the MIRAS running example.
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Use Case Name [Name of the use case] 
Actors [An actor is a person or other entity external to the system being 
specified who interacts with the system and performs use cases 
to accomplish tasks] 
Preconditions [Activities that must take place, or any conditions that must be 
true, before the use case can be started] 
Normal 
Flow 
Description [User actions and system responses that will take place during 
execution of the use case under normal, expected conditions.] 
Postconditions 
 
[State of the system at the conclusion of the use case execution 
with a normal flow (nominal)] 
Alternative flows and 
exceptions 
[Major alternative flows or exceptions that may occur in the flow 
of event] 
 
Non functional 
requirements 
[All non-functional requirement: e.g., dependability (safety, 
reliability, etc.), performance, ergonomic] 
 
Figure 3: Use case textual description template
Use case name UC02. Standing up operation
Abstract The patient stands up with the help of the robot
Precondition The patient is sitting down
The robot is waiting for the standing up 
operation
Battery charge is sufficient to do this task and to 
help the patient to sit down
The robot is in front of the patient
Postcondition The patient is standing up
The robot is in admittance mode
Invariant The patient holds both handles of the robot
The robot is in standing up mode
Physiological parameters are acceptable
Figure 4: UC02 use case textual description with pre,post conditions and invariant
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Sequence diagrams. Figure 5 shows a sequence diagram, describing a possible
scenario, which is actually an instance of an UML use case. This diagram
shows a nominal scenario for the UC02. Other scenarios are possible for the
UC02, like alternative flow of events (e.g., the patient releases the handles
while she is standing up). This second scenario will be represented with
another sequence diagram (not presented here). The expressiveness of such
diagram is well adapted to represent human-robot interactions, and have
proven to be useful while discussing with other stakeholders who are not
experts in this language (doctors, mechanical engineers, etc.). All messages
exchanged between actors and the system are represented along their lifelines.
In our case three types of messages are used:
• indirect interaction through robot teach pendant (hardware or software
interfaces)
• cognitive interaction, e.g., gesture or voice/audio signals are exchanged
• physical interaction, direct contact between physical structure of the
robot and the user
In the example of Figure 5, the messages are all physical contacts, so we did
not add this information which can be done using a UML annotation. In
UML, a sequence diagram is a representation of an Interaction, where actors
and the system (Lifeline), send some Message that might have Arguments
and Constraints. Here the message 2:initiateStandingUp is sent to the robot
with a force exerced on the handles. As the time increases from top to
bottom, each message has a sending and receiving occurrence event. It is
also possible to represent on a message a guard condition for its execution
(e.g., [end of course] of message 4).
We recommend not to use the UML2 fragments (loops, alternatives, etc.)
but to rather use several diagrams to represent alternatives flows for instance.
We also recommend to draw a system sequence diagram, i.e., representing
only the actors and the system, and not the internal objects of the system.
State machines. These deterministic automata diagrams are based on the
statecharts proposed by Harel (1987). A state machine is given for all the
objects with a dynamic behavior. An example is given in Figure 6 where the
considered object is the MIRAS robot controller. A transition is represented
with an arrow between a start state and a destination state, and can have
the following facultative form of event [guard] / action(), where:
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:Patient
: MIRASRobot
1: catchHandles()
2: initiateStandingUp(force)
2.1 : activate
StandingUpMode() 
3. patientStandingUp()
3.1 : courseAssistance()
4 : [end of course] 
activateStrollingMode
Time
sd Standing up nominal
1.1 : detectCatching()
Lifeline
Message 
signature
Message argument
(Sending) 
Occurrence
Specification (Receiving) Occurrence
Specification Interaction constraint
(Guard condition)
Interaction
Figure 5: Sequence diagram for the nominal scenario of UC01: Standing up operation
PhysicalInteraction
Assistance
Idle
Alarm
StandingUp
Strolling
SittingDownBalanceManagement
H
physiological problem 
/ sendAlarm()
[two handles catched] 
initStandingUp
release of handles
end of sitting 
down
end of course
end of strolling
end of unbalanced
unbalance
medical staff 
intervention
Initial state
Final state
Event Action
State
Super state
Condition
History 
operator
Figure 6: Simplified version of MIRAS state machine
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• event is the trigger element of the transition, which could be:
– signal event : asynchronous external event (e.g., button pressed,
voice command)
– call event : reception of an operation called by another object of
the system
– change event : a change of a boolean variable based on the esti-
mation of a system variable
– temporal event (after or when): expired duration after(<duration>),
or absolute time when(date=<date>)
• guard is a condition estimated only if the event occurs
• action is a list of actions performed instantly when the transition is
triggered
In this method we use state diagrams to specify at the beginning of a
project, the different operational modes of the robot. This diagram is also
useful for the detailed design and implementation of the robot controller,
which is out of the scope of this paper.
2.2. HAZOP
HAZOP (HAZard OPerability) is a collaborative hazard identification
technique, developed in the 70’s, and is widely used in the process industries.
It is now standardized by the standard IEC61882 (2001). Its success mainly
lies in its simplicity and the possibility to apply it at the very beginning of the
development process. It is also adaptable to the formalism used to describe
a system as presented in the standard DefStan00-58 (2000). HAZOP does
not consider failure modes as FMECA, but potential deviations of the main
parameters of the process. For each part of the system, the identification of
the deviation is systematically done with the conjunction of:
• system parameters, e.g., in the case of an industrial process : temperature,
pressure, flow, etc.
• guide words like: No, More, Less or Reverse
The role of the guide word is to stimulate imaginative ideas and initiate
discussions. A proposed list of guide words is given in Figure 7. For instance,
we can have the following conjunctions (e.g., for a chemical process):
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Guideword Interpretation 
No/None Complete negation of the design intention / No part of the 
intention is achieved and nothing else happens 
More Quantitative increase 
Less Quantitative decrease 
As Well As All the design intention is achieved together with additions 
Part of Only some of the design intention is achieved 
Reverse The logical opposite of the design intention is achieved 
Other than Complete substitution, where no part of the original intention is 
achieved but something quite different happens 
Early Something happens earlier than expected relative to clock time 
Late Something happens later than expected relative to clock time 
Before Something happens before it is expected, relating to order or 
sequence 
After After Something happens after it is expected, relating to order or 
sequence 
 
Figure 7: Guide words list adapted from IEC61882 (2001)
• Temperature ⊗ More → Temperature too high
• Flow ⊗ Reverse → Product flow reversal
For each deviation, the procedure is then to investigate causes, consequences
and protection, and produce document usually in a table form (similar to
FMECA), with columns like: Guide word, Element, Deviation, Possible
causes, Consequences, Safeguards, Comments, Actions required, etc.
Even though the HAZOP method has proved to be efficient, the results
may be questionable when the boundary of the study is too vast or not well
defined, or when the guide words are either too numerous or too limited for
the analysis to be relevant. Another limitation is that there is no systematic
method to adapt the guide words to the considered domain, so adaptation
depends on the expertise of the initiators of the method. Additionally, the
HAZOP method needs the allocation of human resources and suffers from
combinatorial explosion when too many deviations are considered or when
the analysts go into too much details. Hence, the success of a HAZOP study
depends greatly on the ability of the analyst and the interactions between
team members. The choice of the considered “system parameters”, is of high
importance, because all the study relies on it. The HAZOP-UML method
proposed in this paper is aimed at providing more guidance to analysts to
10
identify which parameters they have to consider.
3. HAZOP-UML
One main issue when applying HAZOP is to identify the system param-
eters. We propose to use UML to partition and describe the system. The
considered parameters will be then some elements of the UML diagrams. In
this section we will give guidelines to identify those parameters, and the asso-
ciated guide words to identify possible deviations. This work is the result of
several applications and refinement, and may also be completed or modified
by the analysts. Even if our objective is to propose a systematic approach, it
is important to note that HAZOP-UML does not identify all hazards. First
because no single hazard identification technique is actually capable of find-
ing all the hazards (Cantrell and Clemens, 2009), and also because we will
focus on the identification of the operational hazards, i.e., hazards linked to
the human-robot interactions, through dynamic models of the system.
As already presented, we propose to focus on the three main dynamic
UML diagrams: use case, sequence and state diagrams. For those diagrams,
some generic deviations are presented in Section 3.1. The whole process is
then introduced in Section 3.2, and Section 3.3 presents a prototype of a tool
for HAZOP-UML.
3.1. Guide words
Instead of using the term “parameter” usually used in HAZOP studies,
entities and attributes of UML elements are introduced in this section. Then
for each element, a generic interpretation for a deviation is proposed. This
analysis is based on the UML metamodel (OMG-UML2, 2007). The selected
UML entities are : use case, message, state machine.
3.1.1. Guide words for use cases
Figure 8 presents an extract from the UML metamodel, focusing on a use
case. The UML class diagram notation is used to represent this metamodel.
This diagram specifies that a use case may be composed of 0 to several (noted
as “*”) Behaviors. Indeed, a use case is usually composed of a nominal behav-
ior (or nominal scenario), and several exceptions. Each Behavior may have
0 to several Constraints, which are pre and post conditions. As introduced
in section 2.1, we add to this metamodel one constraint to the Behavior of
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Behavior
UseCase
Constraint
+precondition +postcondition**
0..10..1
0..1
*
Figure 8: Reduced concepts for specification of use cases
Entity = Use Case 
Attribute Guideword  Interpretation 
Preconditions/ 
Postconditions/ 
Invariants 
No/none The condition is not evaluated and can have any value  
Other than The condition is evaluated true whereas it is false, or vice versa 
As well as The condition is correctly evaluated but other unexpected conditions are true 
Part of 
 
The condition is partially evaluated 
Some conditions are missing 
Early The condition is evaluated earlier than required for correct synchronization 
with the environment 
Late The condition is evaluated later than required for correct synchronization with 
the environment 
 
Table 1: Guide words list and generic interpretation for use cases
a UseCase: the invariant. Indeed, when an analyst studies all possible de-
viations, we would argue that the non-functional requirements, which may
be safety invariants (e.g., robot velocity should not exceed 20cm/s) have to
be taken into account. We should then consider that the attributes of a use
case are: preconditions, postconditions, and invariants, which are all UML
Constraints. For this reason, we apply the classical HAZOP guide words to
the concept of constraint in a generic way and formulate an interpretation to
guide the analyst. The result of this work is given in Table 1. Only six guide
words were interpreted, we also remove many redundancies in the interpreta-
tion. Let consider the example of use case UC02 (”standing up operation”)
described in Figure 4. The precondition “The robot is in front of the patient”
combined with the guide word “No”, leads to the following scenario: the pa-
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Message
Interaction
Occurrence
Specification
GeneralOrdering
LifeLine*
+toBefore+toAfter
+sendEvent
+receiveEvent
0..1
0..10..1
0..1
1
*
NamedElement
ValueSpecification
+argument
+signature
0..1
*
0..1
*
InteractionConstraint
Constraint
1 *
1
*
+guard
1
1
*
1
*
+after+before
Figure 9: Reduced metamodel for interactions in UML (sequence diagrams) extracted
from OMG-UML2 (2007)
tient tries to standup while the robot is not properly positioned. This might
induce excessive effort for the patient and a fall which is catastrophic in our
case study. If we consider this use case, with 9 conditions and 6 guide words,
this leads to 54 possible deviations. Moreover, the interpretation of a guide
word may change from an analyst to another. Nevertheless, the objective is
to eventually identify all hazards, and the original guide word used for the
identification is of no real importance.
3.1.2. Guide words for sequence diagrams
Sequence diagrams are one of the graphical representation of the Interac-
tion UML concept. It is composed of Lifelines exchanging Messages. This
is represented in the simplified metamodel in Figure 9. This metamodel ex-
tracted from OMG-UML2 (2007) has very little differences with the version
(OMG-UML2, 2011), so we kept this representation which is simpler, and
expressive enough for its use in HAZOP-UML. Based on this metamodel, we
define five attributes for the Message:
1. General Ordering: the general order of the messages within the inter-
action
2. Send/receive event timing: event related to the clock time
3. Lifelines: send and receiving lifelines of a message
4. Interaction Constraint: guard condition on a message
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5. Message argument: parameters of a message
Other elements of the metamodel have not been considered, as we did not
find any possible deviation or we intentionally avoid to consider them because
they would have produced redundant possible deviations (interested reader
may find more about UML interaction fragments in OMG-UML2 (2011).
The resulting table for the generic deviations and their interpretation is given
in Table 2. In tOMG-UML2 (2011) the following explanation is given: “A
GeneralOrdering represents a binary relation between two OccurrenceSpec-
ifications, to describe that one OccurrenceSpecification must occur before
the other in a valid trace. This mechanism provides the ability to define
partial orders of OccurrenceSpecifications that may otherwise not have a
specified order.” This could be interpreted as the fact that in some diagrams
a GeneralOrdering relation can be added as a constraint. But in a sequence
diagram, the physical position of the message already specifies an order for a
valid trace. Hence, in our approach, we will interpret a sequence diagram as
a valid trace, i.e., with a valid specified ordering of the message. This trace
is descriptive (and not prescriptive like the state machine), but changing the
ordering may lead to hazardous interactions.
3.1.3. Guide words for state machines
The same approach was used for the state machines. This diagram can
also be used for detailed system design, which may lead to a combinatory ex-
plosion for the HAZOP analysis. Hence, we reduced the number of concepts
to a very simple version as presented in Figure 10. Note that we replaced
in this model the original class Behavior by Action. Actually, in UML an
action is the fundamental unit of behavior specification, which can be asso-
ciated to a state or a transition. We only consider in this method the action
on transitions, which is sufficient to express relevant behavior. Of course,
our proposal could be extended to the complete state machine metamodel,
to identify all possible deviation at design time, but this is out of the scope
of our method.
According to this metamodel, the resulting table for possible deviations
is given in Table 3. In order to provide more guidance, we also point out in
this table if the transition is triggered or not for some deviations.
3.2. HAZOP-UML process and outputs
According to the previous tables, the process to perform HAZOP-UML
is the following procedure: for each entity, for each attribute, for each guide
14
Entity = Message 
Attribute Guideword  Interpretation 
General 
Ordering 
No Message is not sent 
Other than Unexpected message is sent 
As well as Message is sent as well as another message 
More than Message sent more often than intended 
Less than Message sent less often than intended 
Before Message sent before intended 
After Message sent after intended 
Part of Only a part of a set of messages is sent 
Reverse Reverse order of expected messages 
Send/receive 
event timing 
As well as Message sent at correct time and also at incorrect time 
Early Message sent earlier than intended time 
Later Message sent later than intended time 
Lifelines  
(receiving and 
sending objects) 
No Message sent to but never received by intended object 
Other than Message sent to wrong object 
As well as Message sent to correct object and also an incorrect object 
Reverse Source and destination objects are reversed 
More Message sent to more objects than intended 
Less Message sent to fewer objects than intended 
Interaction 
Constraint 
(Message guard 
condition) 
No/none The condition is not evaluated and can have any value  
Other than The condition is evaluated true whereas it is false, or vice versa 
As well as The condition is well evaluated but other unexpected conditions are true 
Part of Only a part of condition is correctly evaluated 
Late The condition is evaluated later than correct synchronization with the 
environment 
Message 
arguments 
(Parameters) 
No/None Expected parameters are never set / returned 
More Parameters values are higher than intended 
Less Parameters values are lower than intended 
As Well As Parameters are also transmitted with unexpected ones 
Part of Only some parameters are transmitted 
Some parameters are missing 
Other than Parameter type / number are different from those expected by the receiver 
 
Table 2: Guide words list and generic interpretation for sequence diagram messages
Transition
State
+source +target11
**
Constraint
Action
0..1*
Event
*
0..1
*
0..1
Figure 10: Adapted UML metamodel of state machine
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Entity = State machine 
Attribute Guideword Interpretation 
Destination 
state 
Other than  The transition leads to another state than expected 
Transition 
No/none The transition is not triggered when intended 
Never The transition is not triggered because the event never occurs or the condition 
is never met 
Event 
No/none The transition is triggered while the event does not occur 
Other than transition not triggered : the transition is not triggered when the event occurs 
transition triggered : the transition is triggered when another event occurs  
Condition 
No/none The condition is not evaluated and can have any value, the transition is 
triggered 
Other than transition not triggered : the condition is evaluated false whereas it is true, 
the transition is not triggered 
transition triggered : the condition is evaluated true whereas it is false, the 
transition is triggered 
As well as The condition is well evaluated but other unexpected conditions are true, the 
transition is triggered 
Part of Only a part of condition is correctly evaluated, the transition is triggered 
Early The condition is evaluated sooner than required, the transition is triggered 
Late The condition is evaluated later than required, the transition is triggered 
Action 
No/none The transition is not triggered, there is no action 
Other than The transition is triggered but an action other than intended takes place  
As well as The transition is triggered, the action as well as an unexpected action take 
place 
Part of The transition is triggered but only a part of action takes place 
Early The transition is triggered but the action takes place sooner than correct 
synchronization with the environment 
Late The transition is triggered but the action takes place later than correct 
synchronization with the environment 
More The transitions is triggered but the result of the action, if quantifiable, is too 
high 
Less The transitions is triggered but the result of the action, if quantifiable, is too low 
 
Table 3: Guide words list and generic interpretation for state machines
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Start Select system entity
Select entity
attribute
Apply a 
deviation 
attribute + 
guideword
Identify possible causes 
and consequences of 
deviation
Evaluate the risk of the 
deviation effect
Formulate 
recommendations for 
prevention of deviation 
and protection against 
consequences
More 
deviations
 to apply?
More 
attributes 
?
More 
entities ?Stop
yes yes yes
no no no
Figure 11: HAZOP-UML process
words, identify one or several possible deviations and analyse it (them). A
graphical view is given in Figure 11. The analysis of the deviation may
include the identification of possible causes and consequences. Depending
on the project, it is also possible to evaluate the risk (consequence of the
deviation effect, and likelihood of the considered deviation). Nevertheless,
this information is usually too complex or impossible to obtain. On the
contrary, such analysis always includes identification of recommendations to
treat the deviation or its causes or it consequences (prevention and protection
means). To establish such a study, the columns of a table as in Figure 12 are
given hereafter:
1. Entity: the UML element on which the deviation is applied (here UC02
is the same for all the table so it is in the head of the table)
2. Line number: for traceability (UCx.line number)
3. Attribute: the considered attribute (e.g., a use case precondition)
4. Guide word: the applied guide word
5. Deviation: the deviation resulting from the combination of the entity
attribute and the guide word based on Tables 1, 2 and 3.
6. Use Case Effect: effect at the use case level.
7. Real World Effect: possible effect in the real world.
8. Severity: rating of effect of the worst case scenario in the real world.
9. Possible Causes: possible causes of the deviation (software, hardware,
human, etc.).
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                                       Date:           
Prepared by:
Revised by:     
Line Number Attribute  Guideword Deviation
Use Case 
Effect
Real World 
Effect Severity
Possible 
Causes
Safety 
Recommandation Remarks
Hazard 
Num.
UC02.15
Battery 
charge is 
sufficient to 
do this task 
and to help 
the patient to 
sit down 
(precond)
No/
none
Battery 
charge is too 
low but the 
robot starts 
the standing 
up operation
The robot 
interrupts its 
movement 
(standing up 
or walking)
Loss of 
balance or fall 
of the patient
Serious
HW/SW 
Failure
Specification 
error
Worst-case 
electrical 
consumption 
must be 
evaluated 
beforehand. Take 
the lower bound 
of the battery 
charge 
estimation
If the robot stops 
during standing 
operation, the 
most probable 
scenario is that 
the patient will 
fall back on the 
seat.
HN6
UC02.16 Other than
Battery 
charge is high 
enough but 
the robot 
thinks 
otherwise
Robot refuses 
to start stand 
up operation
Patient is 
confused None
HW/SW 
Failure
Specification 
error
None
Project: MIRAS 04/08/2009
HAZOP table number: UC02 DMG
Entity: UC02.Standing up operation JG
Figure 12: HAZOP-UML Table extract
10. Safety Recommendations for prevention or protection
11. Remarks: explanation of analysis, additional recommendations, etc.
12. Hazard Numbers: real world effects are identified as hazards and as-
signed a number, helping the users to navigate between results of the
study and the HAZOP-UML tables.
In Figure 12 given example, a precondition of UC02 (previously presented in
Figure 4) is analyzed using the guide words No and Other than. It leads to
identify the hazard HN6 (Fall of the patient due to imbalance caused by the
robot).
The resulting documents are the tables as the raw artefacts, but also:
• a concatenated list of identified hazards
• a list of hypotheses made to perform the analysis, which need to be
confirmed by domain experts to validate the study
• a list of safety recommendations
All those documents reference each others using numbered labels for lines,
hazards (HN), recommendations (Rec), and hypothesis. Examples of a haz-
ard table and recommendation list are given in Figure 13 and Figure 14. As
an example, recommendation Rec2 from Figure 14, covers hazards HN6 (fall
of the patient), and has been formulated in the HAZOP table UC02 line 15
(UC02.15).
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Num. Hazard Severity References
HN4 Fall of the patient without alarm or with a late alarm Severe UC13.SD01.29
HN5 Physiological problem of the patient without alarm or with a late alarm Severe UC03.SD02.57
HN6 Fall of the patient due to imbalance caused by the robot Severe UC12.SD01.19,30
HN7
Failure to switch to safe mode when a 
problem is detected. The robot keeps 
moving
Severe UC12.SD01.62,89
HN1 Incorrect position of the patient during robot use Serious UC13.SD01.1,2,3
Figure 13: Hazard list extract
Num. Safety recommandation Hazard Num. References
Rec1 The standing-up profile should be validated by a human operator 
HN8,
HN12 UC03.SD02.91,96
Rec2
Worst-case electrical consumption must be 
evaluated beforehand (and display of the mean 
battery time left by the robot)
HN6 UC02.15
Rec22
Send regularly a network heartbeat from the 
robot to the medical staff control panel. Launch 
alarm on time-out.
HN6 UC01.SD1.15,24
Rec31
Safety margins should determined for maximum 
and minimum height of the robot (monitoring is 
required)
HN8 UC03.SD02.91
Figure 14: Recommendation list extract
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3.3. A tool for HAZOP-UML
To ease the analysis of complex systems, we developed a prototype of a
tool to support the method. It helps to manage the combinatorial aspects
of the HAZOP method by maintaining consistency between UML models
and HAZOP tables and by providing document generation and management
features. The tool is built as an Eclipse plugin (www.eclipse.org) using the
Graphical Modelling Framework (GMF). In this tool presented in Figure 15,
the analyst can draw UML use case and sequence diagrams. Using guide
word templates, HAZOP tables are automatically generated, ready to be
filled out by the analyst using choice lists.
The list of guide words, the list of columns and the list of severities are
editable using the main project view. Using the template, the analyst can
add a line in the table by selecting a message, and then select applicable
deviations and fill in the corresponding columns. When completing the ta-
ble, the recommendation list and corresponding hazards are automatically
generated in the project view. The toolbox of the HAZOP guide words al-
lows deviations to be added (for example, several deviations for the same
keyword). Finally a report in HTML can be generated consisting of HAZOP
tables, UML diagrams, and hazards, recommendations and hypotheses lists.
4. Experiments and results
This section provides results of the experimentation of HAZOP-UML on
three robotic applications developed within the following projects:
• ANR-MIRAS (Multimodal Interactive Robot of Assistance in Strolling)
(MIRAS, 2009-2013) an assistive robot for standing up, sitting down
and strolling already presented in Section 2.1.
• FP6-PHRIENDS (Physical Human-Robot Interaction: depENDability
and Safety) (PHRIENDS, 2006-2009). The system is a mobile robot
with a manipulator arm. The considered environments are workshops
and factories with human workers. Collaborative work between a hu-
man and a robot is possible (e.g., the robot can give an object to the
human). The arm is the KUKA Light Weight Robot (LWR), a seven
degrees of freedom arm which contains torque and motor position sen-
sors. The mobile base is the KUKA omnirob product.
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Figure 15: Main view of the tool to support the HAZOP-UML method
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• FP7-SAPHARI (Safe and Autonomous Physical Human-Aware Robot
Interaction) (SAPHARI, 2011-2015). As in PHRIENDS, an Indus-
trial coworker operates in a manufacturing setting accessible to human
workers. The mobile manipulator may encounter humans while moving
between the different workstations because the operation area is freely
accessible to human workers. It takes and places part boxes on shelves,
work stations, or on the robot base in order to convey them. The robot
navigates autonomously in its operation area. When the robot encoun-
ters unexpected or difficult situations the worker might intervene and
help by giving the robot direct haptic instructions.
For all three experiments, we followed the same procedure. We recruited
analysts (an engineer for PHRIENDS, a postdoctoral for MIRAS, and a
Phd student for SAPHARI), who were trained in our laboratory to HAZOP-
UML. As a first step, they were in charge of modeling the UML diagrams,
and validate them with robotic and domain experts (for instance in MIRAS,
validation was also performed by doctors from the hospitals of the project).
A second step was the deviation analysis performed only by the recruited
analyst, followed by a revision by another member of our laboratory already
trained to HAZOP-UML. Then, the resulting hazard and recommendation
lists were discussed and validated by the robotic and domain experts. Quan-
titative data (e.g., working time or numbers of deviations) and qualitative
data (e.g., traceability or modifiability) coming from these experiments are
presented in this section, and structured according to the following proper-
ties:
• Applicability: we estimated the resources needed for the application of
HAZOP-UML
• Guide words relevance: this is a critical point of the method as all the
results will depend on the ability of those guide words to guide the
analyst
• Validity: we compared results from a Preliminary Hazard Analysis to
HAZOP-UML to assess its validity.
• Usability: some benefits and limits of HAZOP-UML while using it.
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PHRIENDS MIRAS SAPHARI
Use cases 9 11 15
Conditions 39 45 54
Analyzed deviations 297 317 324
Interpreted deviations 179 134 65
Interpreted deviations with 120 72 50
recommendation
Sequence diagrams 9 12 16
Messages 91 52 122
Analyzed deviations 1397 676 2196
Interpreted deviations 589 163 87
Interpreted deviations with 274 85 36
recommendation
Number of hazards 21 16 28
Table 4: Statistics for the application of HAZOP-UML for the three projects
MIRAS
State Machine diagram 1
States 9
Transitions 19
Analyzed deviations 215
Interpreted deviations with 161
recommandation
Table 5: Statistics for the application of HAZOP-UML State-machine only to MIRAS
4.1. HAZOP-UML applicability
Classic HAZOP is usually applied in collaborative workshops, involving
many partners to maximize the chances of study completeness. On the con-
trary, HAZOP-UML can be applied by a single analyst and then validated
by experts. This comes from the fact that the study is always based on a
UML model, which has been done in collaboration with stakeholders (e.g.,
robotic engineers or medical staff). The fact that their knowledge has been
captured by UML models, makes the safety analyst task more independent
from domain experts. Of course, during the analysis several questions arise,
and hypotheses need to be made to carry out the analysis. They need then to
be validated by the experts (this is why we propose to produce a hypotheses
list).
Considering that a single analyst can perform most of the work, we also
evaluate the effort to perform the complete analysis. Numbers are given in
Table 4 for the three robotic projects. The state-machine version of HAZOP-
UML has only been applied to MIRAS and statistics are presented in Table 5.
For the three projects, the complexity was nearly the same (between 39
and 54 use case conditions, and 91 and 122 messages in sequence diagrams).
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For each project one analyst has been recruited. Those three analysts were a
post-doctoral, an engineer, and a Dr-engineer. “Analyzed deviations” stands
for the number of deviations the analyst has considered, but only a part of
them leads to an ‘Interpreted deviations”.
The resulting numbers show that no combinatory explosion happened,
and less than 0.5 man-month was necessary for each study. Few iterations
for table updates were needed (between 2 and 3). The presented tool in
Section 3.3 was under development during those three projects, so we used a
classic spreadsheet software with templates and macros. The cross checking
between HAZOP tables and UML diagrams was then done by hand, which is
clearly a limit that we want to reduce with our tool. Same conclusions were
drawn for the state machine study, which was only applied to the MIRAS
project (Table 5). However, those three projects were successful regarding
the applicability of our method.
4.2. HAZOP-UML guide words relevance
For all projects, statistics of guide word usage have been made. The
results of PHRIENDS project are presented in Tables 6 and 7. A first remark
is that most of the guide words have been used by the analyst except in some
special cases. The lifeline attribute is particularly useful when the robotic
system is communicating with different actors (e.g., other robots), which was
not the case in our project. The PHRIENDS UML diagrams also did not
include any constraint on the messages, so the “Interaction constraints” guide
words weren’t used either in our case study. The guide word “Less than”
(Message sent less often than intended) was also not used, as no constraint
on frequency for messages was specified in the UML diagrams. The analyst
also considered that “Part of” (only a part of a set of message is sent) was
not relevant, because the level of description of UML diagram did not allow
to consider parts of a message (as it may be the case with complex message
sending with long protocol). Nevertheless, we chose to keep these guide words
as in some special cases they would be applicable.
Another result, which is not presented here, is the redundancy of the
hazards found, with different guide words. This is actually not an issue,
because our main objective is to find a list of hazards, whatever guide word
used to identify it. To determine if the guide words list is not limiting, we
only rely on the results of the application on the three projects. A formal
demonstration is actually impossible, and as already discussed, no single
hazard identification technique is actually capable of finding all the hazards.
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Results Use cases 
Sequence 
diagrams 
Total 
Attributes  39 91 130 
Guidewords  6 
29 
(16 applicable) 
22 
Analyzed 
deviations  
297 1397 1694 
N/A deviations  118 808 926 
Interpreted 
deviations  
179 589 768 
 
Use case 
attributes 
Guidewords Deviations Interpretation 
Conditions (39) 
(pre/post/inv) 
No/none 42 39 
Other than 95 95 
As well as 41 23 
Part of 40 10 
Early 40 9 
Late 39 3 
Total 297 179 
 
 
Message 
attributes 
Guidewords Deviations Interpretations 
1. General 
Ordering 
No 91 75 
Other than 97 25 
As well as 91 13 
More than 91 7 
Less than 0 0 
Before 92 32 
After  91 15 
Part of 0 0 
Reverse 91 43 
2. Message 
timing 
Early 91 28 
Later 91 28 
3. Lifelines 
Not applicable in our case study, which 
considers only a single robot (and a single 
human) 
4. Interaction 
Constraint 
No constraint were specified in the UML models 
5. Message 
arguments 
No/None 91 59 
More 91 52 
Less 91 62 
As Well 
As 
71 2 
Part of 95 31 
Other than 112 98 
 
Table 6: Sequence diagram guide words utility in PHRIENDS
We thus consider that in order to propose a systematic approach, the selected
guide words are sufficient to identify all the major hazards.
4.3. HAZOP-UML validity
Table 8 presents two results for validity. First, this study shows that
all hazards found during the PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis), done by
collaborative workshop between a safety analyst and robotic experts, were
also identified during HAZOP-UML (performed by the analyst), and that
new hazards were also found. The fact that all scenarios of use were modeled
in UML significantly improves the analysis. For instance, the hazard HN11
(Disturbance of medical staff during an intervention), was only identified
during use case analysis, and never mentioned during the PHA, whereas it
is highly relevant in case of emergency intervention.
The second analysis presented in this Table shows that use cases (UC) and
messages (Seq) analysis are complementary, whereas state machine analysis
has a redundant contribution for hazard identification. For instance, HN4
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Results Use cases 
Sequence 
diagrams 
Total 
Attributes  39 91 130 
Guidewords  6 
29 
(16 applicable) 
22 
Analyzed 
deviations  
297 1397 1694 
N/A deviations  118 808 926 
Interpreted 
deviations  
179 589 768 
 
Use case 
attributes 
Guidewords Deviations Interpretation 
Conditions (39) 
(pre/post/inv) 
No/none 42 39 
Other than 95 95 
As well as 41 23 
Part of 40 10 
Early 40 9 
Late 39 3 
 
 
Message 
attributes 
Guidewords Deviations Interpretations 
1. General 
Ordering 
No 91 75 
Other than 97 25 
As well as 91 13 
More than 91 7 
Less than 0 0 
Before 92 32 
After  91 15 
Part of 0 0 
Reverse 91 43 
2. Message 
timing 
Early 91 28 
Later 91 28 
3. Lifelines 
Not applicable in our case study, which 
considers only a single robot (and a single 
human) 
4. Interaction 
Constraint 
No constraint were specified in the UML models 
5. Message 
arguments 
No/None 91 59 
More 91 52 
Less 91 62 
As Well 
As 
71 2 
Part of 95 31 
Other than 112 98 
 
Table 7: Use case guide words utility in PHRIENDS
Num Description PHA 
HAZOP-UML 
UC Seq. State Machine 
HN1 Incorrect posture of the patient during robot use 2" 4" 3" 4"
HN2 Fall of patient due to imbalance not caused by the robot "" 29" 27" 30"
HN3 Robot shutdown during its use 1" 2" "" 5"
HN4 Patient falls without alarm or with a late alarm "" 11" 13" 32"
HN5 Physiological problem of the patient without alarm or with a late alarm "" 15" 10" ""
HN6 Fall of the patient due to imbalance caused by the robot 10" 51" 37" 10"
HN7 Failure to switch to safe mode when a problem is detected. The robot keeps on moving "" 8" "" ""
HN8 Robot parts catching patient or clothes 3" 5" 4" ""
HN9 Collision between the robot (or robot part) and the patient 2" 14" 14" ""
HN10 Collision between the robot and a person other than the patient "" 5" 14" 2"
HN11 Disturbance of medical staff during an intervention "" 1" "" ""
HN12 Patient loses his/her balance due to the robot (without falling) 11" 1" 70" 1"
HN13 Robot manipulation causes patient fatigue 12" 1" 53" 21"
HN14 I juries of the patient due to robot sudden movements while carrying the patient on its seat "" "" 3" ""
HN15 Fall of the patient from the robot seat 2" 10" 12" ""
HN16 Frequent false positive alarms (false alarm) "" "" 3" ""
 
Table 8: Hazard list and occurrences in PHA and HAZOP-UML in MIRAS
identified 11 and 13 times during use case and sequence diagrams analyses,
has been identified 32 more times during state machine analysis. Neverthe-
less, we believe that state machine analysis is also interesting to identify more
sources of deviations that could be used in other risk analysis methods, and
also provide safety recommendations which are different from use cases and
messages ones.
4.4. HAZOP-UML usability
A major advantage of HAZOP-UML lies in its simplicity. Indeed, UML
models have been simplified to be easily understandable by non experts with-
out reducing its expressiveness. HAZOP is also an intuitive method. Several
engineers from different domains (electronics, computer science or risk man-
agement) have been trained to the method in few days.
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HAZOP-UML is completely integrated and consistent with the develop-
ment process. Indeed, same UML diagrams were used in the projects, to
define the scenarios. This helped us for each iteration in the development
process to easily update the HAZOP tables. This traceability is an impor-
tant issue in safety analysis methods, which are usually applied once due to
the cost to apply them.
Among HAZOP-UML limitations, we remind that HAZOP-UML is fo-
cusing on operational hazards (linked with the robot tasks). We thus do not
consider “machine” hazards already defined in many standards, like electro-
cution, explosion, etc. As already mentioned, this method should be com-
pleted by other hazard analysis techniques. A second limitation is the fact
that the UML models and HAZOP tables do not explicitly mention the en-
vironment conditions of execution. For instance, a similar scenario but with
high or low level of light might change the deviations and their consequences.
It is still an open issue and an integration in the UML models would be an
interesting direction. Last but not least, the HAZOP-UML has the same
drawback as other risk analysis methods, which is a difficult determination
and expression of the hazard because of the fuzziness of a hazard definition
(“potential source of harm”, from ISO/IEC-Guide51 (1999)) which may des-
ignate both a cause or a consequence. Three columns in the HAZOP table
can represent a hazard: deviation, use case effect, real word effect. In many
tables, we found that some real word effects were already mentioned as use
case effects in other HAZOP table lines. We chose to reduce the number
of hazards, taking into account only the “real word effect” as a hazard, but
for some cases where it was obvious that the treatment would be completely
different, we also took into account the deviation and use case effect. For
instance, in Table 8, the hazard HN2 (Fall of patient due to imbalance not
caused by the robot) and HN6 (Fall of the patient due to imbalance caused
by the robot), lead both to the fall of the patient, but have been differenti-
ated. Even if we provide a well guided method, extraction and formulation
of hazards list require a high level of expertise from the safety analyst, in
order to choose the right level of description of a hazard.
5. Related work on model-based hazard identification, tools and
methods
This section presents related work, focusing on model-based safety anal-
ysis, and more particularly those using UML. The concept of “model-based”
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refers to the fact that a safety analysis technique (e.g., FTA) is based on
an abstract representation of the studied system. This was already done at
the very first hours of the risk analysis techniques using for instance block
diagrams, or had-hoc representations. The quite recent model-based term,
usually refers to the use of standardized models (like UML) and the possibil-
ity to have tools assisting analysts to produce automatic, or semi-automatic
safety analysis based on a system model. Generally, model-based safety anal-
yses focus on the following issues (Blanquart, 2010):
1. Fault propagation analysis
(a) bottom-up: a fault effect on the system
(b) top-down: induction of faults inducing an unwanted effect
2. Dependability (or safety) properties verification
3. Quantification of probability of unwanted events
Many high-level modeling languages for safety analyses have been defined
to cover those points. Just to cite some of them, HIPS-HOPS (Hierarchi-
cally Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies) and its associated
tool developed at Hull university 2, automatically generates fault trees and
FMECA tables starting from system models (e.g., Simulink models). For
each component, fault annotations are given, and the tool propagates those
faults to build safety models (e.g., Fault trees). Altarica (Boiteau et al., 2006;
Lipaczewski et al., 2015) provides means for fault tree generation or prop-
erties verification from system and reliability models. Additionally, many
European research projects addressed model-based safety analysis: ESACS
(2001-2003)3 in transportation domain, followed by ISAAC (2004-2007) 4 in
avionics, then CESAR (2009-2012) 5 followed by CRYSTAL (2013-2017) 6
for embedded systems. Previous techniques and works, usually rely on a
precise description of the system behavior, which is usually not available at
the beginning of a human-robot project.
The method put forward in this paper falls within the scope of fault prop-
agation analysis, and can be described as a “middle-up approach”, as we do
2http://hip-hops.eu (accessed 2015-05-15)
3www.transport-research.info/web/projects/project_details.cfm?ID=2658
4http://ec.europa.eu/research/transport/projects/items/isaac_en.htm
5www.cesarproject.eu
6www.crystal-artemis.eu
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not start from “faults” but from deviations. Our objective is then to iden-
tify hazards (and hazardous situations) during human-robot interaction. A
very close work is advanced by Leveson (2011), with a method called STPA
(System Theoretic Process Analysis), which provides guidance to users com-
bining guide words (like in HAZOP) and fault models, applied to models,
based on a process/controller/actuator/sensor representation. Many recent
applications of STPA can be found, e.g., in robotics (Alemzadeh et al., 2015),
space (Ishimatsu et al., 2010), railway (Thomas and Leveson, 2011) or au-
tomotive (Sulaman et al., 2014). One difference with our approach is that
scenarios are actually not modeled in this approach. Users are represented
as “controllers”, which is not clear while describing human-robot interac-
tions. STPA objective is also different in the way that it really focuses on
the identification of cause-consequence chain, which is not the objective of
HAZOP-UML (only find the hazards and hazardous situations). We also pro-
pose to use UML which is not the case in STPA. On the contrary, the work
done in the CORAS project (CORAS, 2014; Bjørn Axel Gran and Thunem,
2004), is based on UML to analyse security. Even if we focus on safety, our
objectives are the same. A major difference is that we strongly intercon-
nect UML models and the risk analysis technique HAZOP, which was not
addressed in CORAS.
Our risk analysis approach is based on a re-interpretation of HAZOP
guidewords in the context of some UML diagrams. A similar approach has
been followed in some previous studies considering UML structural diagrams
(Hansen et al., 2004; Gorski and Jarzebowicz, 2005; Jarzebowicz and Go´rski,
2006) and dynamic diagrams (Johannessen et al., 2001; Allenby and Kelly,
2001; Arlow et al., 2006; Iwu et al., 2007; Srivatanakul, 2005). In all those
papers, the guide words were quite reduced (e.g., only omission and com-
mission) or the link with UML language elements was not fully explored.
We actually extended the results of those studies, focusing only on use case,
sequence and state machine diagrams, in order to explore deviations during
operational life. We also paid a particular attention to the human errors
expression and analysis in this method, which was absent from the previous
papers.
6. Conclusion
We set forth a new method for the safety analysis of human-robot interac-
tion called HAZOP-UML. To build this method we used the UML metamodel
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to identify the basic elements of three dynamic models. We then proposed
three guide words tables for use cases, messages of sequence diagrams, and
state machines. Those guide words tables help the safety analyst to imag-
ine possible deviations for every elements of those dynamic models. Those
deviations are then reported in HAZOP tables, where causes, consequences,
and recommendations are formulated. This process produces lists of hazards,
recommendations, and hypotheses.
This method has been applied successfully on several projects, and we
present in this paper a general analysis of the benefits and the limits of
the method. We particularly focus on the applicability and validity of the
approach. Main advantages of HAZOP-UML are:
• simple (training and application)
• applicable at the first step of the development process
• limits the combinatory explosion
• consistent with system models, and inherits of system modeling bene-
fits: traceability and modifiability
• easily supported by a computer assisting tool
Even if the models and HAZOP tables can be easily achieved, the main limit
lies in the necessity of a high expertise to formulate hazards from HAZOP
tables. It is up to the safety analyst to determine the right level of detail for
the hazard identification.
Additionally to the three projects presented in this paper, HAZOP-UML
has also been used as a first step of a method to build independent safety
monitors in the context of autonomous robots (Machin et al., 2014), and we
also plan to use it as an entry point for defining virtual words for testing
mobile robots in simulation. A future direction is the complete transfer to
industry, which is already started in the project CPSELabs (2015-2018).
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